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Higher Education:  The Ultimate Winner-Take-All Market?
by
Robert H. Frank1
John Maynard Keynes once compared investing in the stock market to picking the
winner of a beauty contest.  In each case, it’s not who you think will win, but who you
think others will pick.  The same characterization increasingly applies to a student’s
choice among universities.  This choice depends much less now on what any individual
student may think, and much more on what panels of experts think.  The U.S. News &
World Report’s annual college ranking issue has become by far the magazine’s biggest
seller, and the same is true of Business Week’s biennial issue ranking the nation’s top
MBA programs.  The size of a school’s applicant pool fluctuates sharply in response to
even minor movements in these rankings.
In my remarks today, I’ll discuss some of the reasons for the growing importance
of academic rankings.  I’ll also explore how our increased focus on them has affected the
distribution of students and faculty across schools, the distribution of financial aid across
students, and the rate at which costs have been escalating in higher education.
How the Market for Higher Education Differs from Markets Portrayed in
Economics Textbooks
The economist Gordon Winston has said that buyers in the market for higher
education confront a decision more like a one-shot investment in a cancer cure than
shopping for groceries.  But this characterization actually understates the difference
2between the typical market described in economics textbooks and the market for higher
education.  Shopping for groceries and shopping for a cancer cure in fact have far more in
common with one another than with shopping for a spot in an American university.
If popular grocers or oncologists charge inflated fees, their high earnings will
attract competitors who will drive prices back down.  But that’s not the way things work
in the market for higher education.  There, especially at the high end of the market,
demand exceeds supply at the stated price—year in and year out—by an enormous
margin.  At one small, high-quality liberal arts institution in the East, for example, 4500
people apply each year for only 500 positions in the freshman class.  At universities
nearer the pinnacle of the academic pyramid, an even higher proportion of eager
customers are routinely turned away.
In contrast, when excess demand arises in the market for an ordinary private good
or service, it is almost always fleeting.  Thus, when Porsche recently introduced its new
Boxster, each new delivery was sold out more than a year in advance, yet anyone who
really wanted this car could find one at a price.  Not so in the upper reaches of the
academic market.  Despite the persistence of excess demand in this market, universities
continue to turn qualified students away, while charging those they admit only about one
third of what it costs to serve them.  This pattern, needless to say, bears little resemblance
to the one portrayed in economics textbooks.
For present purposes, the salient difference between a university and the producer
of a sports car is that although the attractiveness of a sports car does not depend on the
average driving skill level of its buyers, the attractiveness of a university depends
                                                                                                                                      
1 Goldwin Smith Professor of Economics, Cornell University.  This paper was presented at the Forum for
the Future of Higher Education, Aspen, Colorado, September 27, 1999.
3strongly on the average intellectual ability of its students.  Applicants want to be at a
school whose students are accomplished, partly because they can learn more by
interacting with such students, but also because that’s where the best employers
concentrate heir recruiting.  In short, the university’s customers are one of the most
important inputs in its production process, and this is not the case for producers of typical
private goods and services.
If the ability to affiliate with elite institutions is so highly valued, why don’t these
institutions simply raise their tuition?  The answer is that they need top students every bit
as much as top students need them.  A school without top-ranked students cannot hope to
achieve elite status.
This co-dependence creates multiple positiv -feedback loops that amplify the
rewards for a university that succeeds in its efforts to move forward in the academic
pecking order.  And the same positive-feedback loops exacerbate the penalties on those
who begin to slip in the rankings.  When Cornell’s Johnson Graduate School of
Management jumped from 18th to th in the Business Week rankings in 1998 (the largest
such advance in the poll’s history), applications for the following year’s class rose more
than 50 percent.  To an extent rivaled perhaps only by the market for trendy nightclubs,
higher education is an industry in which success breeds success and failure breeds failure.
Why Does Rank Matter So Much More Now?
Hierarchy in education is nothing new, of course, and it has always been
important.  But as we are all keenly aware, it has become far more important than in the
4past.  Why this change?  The short answer is that the economic reward for elite
educational credentials has jumped sharply in recent decades.
Behind this jump lies the spread and intensification of what Philip Cook and I
have called “winner-take-all markets.”  These are markets in which small differences in
performance (or even small differences in the credentials used to predict performance)
translate into extremely large differences in reward.
Such markets have long been familiar in entertainment and sports.  The best
soprano may be only marginally better than the seco d-best, but in a world in which most
people listen to music on compact discs, there is little need for the second-best.  In such a
world, the best soprano may earn a seven-figure annual salary while the second-best
struggles to get by.  In similar fashion, new technologies allow us to clone the services of
the most talented performers in a growing number of occupations, thereby enabling them
to serve ever broader and more lucrative markets.
The market for tax advice, for example, was once served almost exclusively by a
large army of local practitioners, but is increasingly served by the developers of a small
handful of software programs.  Scores of programs competed for reviewer approval in the
early stages of this transition.  But once opinion leaders anointed Intuit’s “TurboTax” and
Kiplinger’s “TaxCut” as the most comprehensive, user-friendly programs, competing
programs faced a nearly impossible task.
A constellation of factors helps us understand why similar shakeouts have
occurred in industry after industry.  The information revolution has made us more aware
of product quality differences than ever and puts us in direct contact with the world’s best
suppliers.  Sharply reduced transportation costs and tariff barriers enable these suppliers
5to ship their products to us more cheaply than before.  Research and development costs
and other fixed costs now comprise a larger share of total costs, making it harder for
small producers to achieve efficient scale.
Another important contributor to the winner-take-all trend is that the world’s
increasingly affluent buyers appear to care more than ever about product rank per se.  For
example, whereas the demand for any given make of car was once based largely on
functional characteristics like size, reliability, and fuel economy, buyers increasingly
search for something more.  They want a fast car, or one that handles well, or one that
stands out from the crowd.  These characteristics are far more context-dependent than
fuel economy and reliability.  How fast does a car have to be to impress the potential
buyer? If a car produced in 1925 could reach 60 mph eventually, the driver would have
experienced it as breathtakingly exciting, a really fast car.  Today if your car does not get
from 0 to 60 mph in under 6 seconds, it doesn’t seem like a fast car.  Context-sensitive
characteristics like speed and handling dictate an increasing share of purchase decisions
in automobile markets.  And when what people want is defined in relative terms, only a
limited number of suppliers can deliver.  In the extreme case, only a single company can
truthfully claim to offer the fastest car in the market.
One result of the movement toward winner-take-all markets has been an
explosion in the salaries paid to the handful of key players who are most responsible for
an organization’s success.  American CEOs, for example, earned 419 times as much as
the average worker last year, up from only 42 times as much in 1980.  The top one-
percent of US earners have seen their real incomes more than double since 1979, a period
during which the median income has remained essentially unchanged.
6The increase in financial stakes in the business community has spawned an
extremely lucrative market for high-end services like business consulting, investment
banking, and corporate law, three fields of particular interest in our efforts to understand
the increased demand for elite educational credentials.  Each field is one in which rank is
of paramount importance.
Suppose you were the CEO of a financially distressed corporation and were
looking for advice from a management-consulting firm.  Which firm should you hire,
McKinsey—widely thought to be first among equals in the management consulting
field—or some lesser-ranked firm that is considerably cheaper, yet, in absolute terms,
nearly as good?  You know that in either case the advice you get may not eliminate your
firm’s financial woes, and if it doesn’t, your board of directors will want to know why.  If
you had hired McKinsey, you could respond that you sought the best available advice and
followed it.  Critics might still second-guess you.  But you would be far less vulnerable to
their charges than if you had hired some lesser-ranked firm.  And if McKinsey’s advice
worked, no one would ever complain that you paid too much for it.
The upshot is that McKinsey and a handful of other elite management-consulting
firms are essentially able to set extremely high prices and still attract more business than
they can handle.  As employers, such firms also have their pick of the most able college
graduates.  When they post positions, mail sacks full of resumes arrive in their personnel
offices day after day.  And no wonder.  If a new recruit survives the early rounds and
becomes a partner, she’ll reap an annual salary of many hundreds of thousands of dollars.
That such salaries persistently attract an enormous surplus f applicants might
seem to suggest that the eli e consulting firms are paying far too much.  Why don’t they
7just offer less money and attract only the number of qualified applicants they need?  The
answer is not that they have failed to grasp the elementary logic of supply and demand.
On the contrary, as in the case of elite universities, they understand that a very different
logic governs the hiring decisions of organizations whose fate hinges on reputation and
relative performance.  These firms need the graduates of elite institutions just as much as
those graduates need them.  And the more applicants they attract, the better they do.
After all, they are selling advice, perhaps the most the most difficult of all
services to evaluate.  They send recruits who are barely out of school to advise seasoned
professionals about what they should do with their businesses.  Under the circumstances,
establishing credibility is a tall order—perhaps an impossibly tall order for graduates of
institutions with less than elite status.  When the client knows that he is dealing with a
graduate of an elite school, however, things are different.  Every year more high school
valedictorians apply to Stanford than there are positions in Stanford’s freshman class.
The client himself may have gone to Stanford in the 1950s, but he knows that if he had
applied to Stanford in the last decade, he probably would have been rejected.  Although
this knowledge may operate completely below the level of conscious awareness, it
nonetheless confers an unmistakable gloss on the advice given by the elite school
graduate.
For our purposes, the important point is that even if McKinsey and the other elite
consulting firms had time to interview everyone who submits an application, they would
still have good reasons for confining their attention to the graduates of elite institutions.
You might be exceedingly well qualified, but if you are not from one of these schools,
odds are they won’t even talk to you.
8The logic is essentially the same in many other winner-take-all labor markets.
Want to be a top mergers-and-acquisitions attorney?  Better graduate with honors from an
elite law school.  Want to be an investment banker?  Better go to one of the top-ranked
business schools.
One consequence of the growing reward for attending a top-ranked professional
or graduate program is that competition for admission into these programs has become
much more intense.  How can a student assure admission to such a program?  In an
earlier day, it was sufficient to compile a strong undergraduate record at almost any
college or university.  But no longer.  A friend who teaches at Harvard described to me
the case of a woman from a small Florida college who had applied to Harvard’s graduate
program in economics several years ago.  She had scored within a few points of 800 on
her GREs, both quantitative and verbal, and also had a very high score on the economics
achievement test.  She had straight A’s and glowing recommendations from several
senior professors, who described her as the best student they’d ever encountered.  The
admissions committee agonized long and hard over this woman’s file, but in the end
decided to reject her.  They simply had too many other applicants who had compiled
equally strong records at much more highly selective institutions.
Students, in short, confront an increasingly competitive environment.  Between
1979 and 1989, the percentage of students who scored above 700 on the SAT verbal
section and matriculated at one of the 33 “most competitive” schools on the Barron’  list
rose from 32 percent to 43 percent.  And as more and more of the best students attend the
most selective schools, the payoff for going to these schools gets ever higher.
9The fact that elite schools are increasingly the gateway to professional positions
offering six-figure starting salaries has fueled the explosive growth in demand for elite
educational credentials.  And the growth in demand for elite educational credentials
explains the growing importance of academic rankings.  The market for higher education,
always a winner-take-all market, has become perhaps the quintessential example of such
a market.
The Positional Arms Race
Contestants in virtually every winner-take-all market face strong incentives to
invest in performance enhancement, thereby to enhance their chances of coming out
ahead.  As in the classic military arms race, however, many such investments prove
mutually offsetting in the end.  When each nation spends more on bombs, the balance of
power is no different than if none had spent more.  Yet that fact alone provides no escape
for individual contestants.  Countries may find it difficult to spend a lot on bombs, but
they find it even more distasteful to be less well armed than their rivals.
In light of the growing importance of rank in the educational marketplace,
universities face increasing pressure to bid for the various resources that facilitate the
quest for high rank.  These pressures have spawned a “positional arms race” that has
already proved extremely costly, and promises to become more so.
Distinguished, highly visible faculty are one of the key ingredients in the effort to
achieve and maintain elite educational status.  And so it is no surprise that star faculty
command ever higher salaries and require ever more elaborate and costly support.  In one
well-publicized case in 1997, Columbia University offered an annual salary of $300,000
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in its effort to lure the Harvard economist Robert Barr  to join its faculty.  Columbia also
offered Barro a large, heavily subsidized apartment near campus;  cre ted a high-profile
job for his wife;  secured a slot in an exclusive Manhattan private school for his son; and
offered him the opportunity to hire six colleagues of his own choosing.  Barro was sorely
tempted by this offer, and indeed he initially accepted it.  In the end, however, he
apparently could not bring himself to overcome the gravitational pull of Harvard’s own
high rank.
Top students, as noted, are an essential ingredient of elite educational status, and
efforts to attract these students have kept pace with efforts to attract star faculty.  Schools
up and down the academic totem pole are spending far more than ever on brochures,
videos, mailings, multi-state tours by admissions officials, and other efforts to woo top
students.  Yet when all schools increase their expenditures on these activities, the effect is
similar to an across-the-board increase in advertising by cigarette companies.  The
additional spending adds to the cost burden, but has little impact on the ultimate
distribution of consumer choices.
Schools are spending more now not just to attract good students, but also to keep
them happy once they arrive.  For example, as the material living standards of affluent
Americans have escalated in recent years, universities have felt increasing pressure to
upgrade campus amenities.  Yesterday’s double-room occupancy standard in dormitories
is giving way to apartment-like suites that house one student per bedroom.  Centralized
athletic complexes are giving way to in-dorm training facilities that resemble expensive
private health clubs.  Dining halls are being supplanted by facilities modeled after the
food courts in up-market shopping malls.  Multimillion-dollar, state-of-the-art classroom
11
facilities are increasingly part of the mix.  Universities that fail to offer such facilities
often fail in their efforts to attract the disproportionate share of high-achievement
students who come from affluent families.  But these facilities also create new financial
hurdles for middle- and low-income parents.
Career counseling and job placement services are another important focus of the
effort to attract top students.  In business schools, for example, placement officers are
now expected to assure that each MBA lands not only the job of his or her choice upon
graduation, but also a prestigious summer internship between the first and second years
of study.  These demands have proven costly to meet.  The staff of the Career Services
Office at Cornell's Johnson School, for example, has more than doubled in the last ten
years.  Changes of this sort in business schools typically portend similar changes in the
broader university environment.
If meeting demands for student services is costly, failure to meet these demands
often proves even more costly.  Student evaluations are one of the two most important
components in the Business Week rankings formula, and as many top MBA programs
have discovered to their chagrin, student dissatisfaction quickly translates into a drop in
the rankings.
Implications for Need-Based Financial Aid
The new competitive climate has also produced sweeping changes in financial aid
decisions.  From the university’s perspective, the merit scholar is an asset whose value
has appreciated sharply.  Other things equal, someone who scored 750 on both sections of
the SAT always paid a lower net price at the bursar’s window than someone who scored
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only 700.  But never before have we witnessed such intense bidding to attract the highest-
scoring students.
Think of yourself as the admissions director of a school trying to move forward in
the academic pecking order.  On your desk sit the folders for two applicants.  They have
almost the same credentials, but one is just a little better than the other.  She has a 4.2
average while the other has a 3.8.  She got 790 on both SATs while the other got only
700.  The applicant with better credentials comes from a family with an annual income of
$500,000, while the other student’s family earns only $30,000.  Now, as in the past, you
accept both students.  In the past, your financial aid package for these students would
have been tailored in a way that I think most of us would feel was just:  The student from
the family with limited means would have gotten a large aid package, and the student
with no financial constraints would have gotten a much smaller package, or more likely
no aid at all.  In today’s climate, however, such offers would almost guarantee that the
better qualified student would go elsewhere.  And that would make your university less
attractive to other top students and faculty.  In light of the feedback loops discussed
earlier, the indirect effects of failure to land even a single top student can multiply many
fold.  And this, in a nutshell, explains the growing tendency for merit-based financial aid
to displace need-based financial aid.
In sum, universities face increased pressure to pay higher salaries to star faculty,
to spend more on marketing, more on student services and amenities, and more on
financial aid to top-ranked students.  It is little wonder, then, that their fi ancial situations
have grown more precarious, despite the record growth in the value of their endowment
portfolios.
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Positional Arms Control Agreements
Unlike expenditures on military armaments, not all expenditures in the battle for
elite educational status are socially wasteful.  Conveniently located workout rooms are
better than distant ones, for example, and marketing expenditures in some instances may
facilitate an improved match between students and schools.  But the competitive
dynamics that govern these expenditures virtually guarantee a measure of social waste.
In the realm of marketing, for example, the socially optimal allocation would be to
increase marketing expenditures until the social value of the improved match quality thus
obtained was exactly equal to its cost.  Individual universities have powerful incentives to
push marketing expenditures past that point, however, because each dollar they spend
creates the additional private benefit of helping lure a good student away from another
school.  The rub is that these private benefits sum to zero on the social scale, since one
school’s gain is offset by another’s loss.  From a social perspective, then, it would be
better if all schools spent less.  Yet no school dares cut its own expenditures unilaterally,
just as no nation dares reduce its spending on armaments unilaterally.
Under these circumstances, it is often possible to generate socially preferred
outcomes through what I call “positional arms control” agreements, pacts in which
contestants pledge mutual restraint.  Many elite institutions, for example, were once party
to an agreement whereby they pledged to target limited financial aid money for those
students with the greatest financial needs.  This was essentially a cartel agreement to curb
competition for students with elite credentials.  Animated by its belief that unbridled
competition always and everywhere leads to the best outcome, the Justice Department
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took a dim view of this agreement.  And it brought an antitrust suit that led to its
termination.
Once we appreciate the logic of the financial incentives that confront participants
in winner-take-all markets, however, we may feel less inclined to embrace the mantra
that all outcomes of open competition must be good.  The problem, as noted, is that when
reward depends on rank, behavior that looks attractive to each individual often looks
profoundly unattractive from the perspective of the group.  Collusive agreements to
restrain these behaviors can create gains for everyone. Of course, cooperative agreements
to limit competition can also cause harm, as in the notorious price-fixing cases of anti-
trust lore.
The challenge, of course, is to make informed distinctions.  Anti-trust authorities
might consider a retreat from their uncritical belief that unlimited competition necessarily
leads to the greatest good for all.  Manifestly it does not.  Collective agreements should
be scrutinized not on quasi-religious grounds, but according to the practical test of
whether they limit harmful effects of competition without compromising its many benign
effects.  In my view, the collective agreement among universities regarding financial aid
policy was a positional arms control agreement that clearly met this test.
Looking Ahead
In New York State the 90th-percentile earner earned 20 times as much as the 10th-
percentile earner in 1997, the highest value of this ratio for any state and the highest in
New York’s history.  That same year, the corresponding ratio for Utah was only 7.  The
economic forces that give rise to winner-take-all markets are here to stay.  Years hence,
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the ratio in New York will be still higher that it is today, and the ratio in Utah will be
much closer to the ratio in New York.  As the top jobs in society grow ever more
lucrative, competition to land those jobs will grow steadily more intense, as will the
competition for the educational credentials that are increasingly the prerequisite for
landing even an initial interview.
No university, acting alone, can escape the powerful logic of the positional arms
race.  Yet there remain compelling ethical reasons both for limiting the escalation in the
cost of acquiring higher education and for basing financial aid more heavily on need than
on merit.  Indeed, the growth in income and wealth inequality caused by spreading
winner-take-all markets makes the case for cost containment and need-based aid more
compelling than ever.  But such goals can be met only through collective action.
Positional arms control agreements may be the only practical way to keep higher
education within reach for the average American family.  To resist such agreements on
the grounds that they are anti-competitive would make sense only if the market for higher
education were just like the market for an ordinary private good or service.
